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SELF-INCRIMINATION AND THE STATES: RESTRIKING
THE BALANCE
AT the end of its recently concluded term the Supreme Court rendered two
far-reaching decisions concerning the privilege against self-incrimination in the
federal context. In Malloy v. Hogan 1 a sharply-divided Court extended the
fifth amendment privilege through the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment to bind states. In a companion case, Murphy v. Waterfront Com-
mission,2 the Court reversed a state contempt decree against two defendants
who, despite grants of state immunity, had refused to answer questions out of
fear of federal incrimination. Holding that neither such state testimony nor its
fruits could be used in a subsequent federal prosecution,3 the Court remanded
the case to give the defendants an opportunity to reconsider their refusals to
answer.
The Malloy decision is but another indication of the Court's awareness of
the need to limit state power in order to protect the individual. It represents
a logical step in the process of incorporating in the fourteenth amendment
specific protections of the Bill of Rights.4 The step, moreover, is one supported
1. 32 U.S.L. WEEK 4507 (U.S. June 15, 1964).
2. 32 U.S.L. WEEK 4518 (U.S. June 15, 1964).
3. The Court's sweeping new rule demands that "a state witness may not be com-
pelled to give testimony which may be incriminating under federal law unless the com-
pelled testimony and its fruits cannot be used in any manner by federal officials in con-
nection with a criminal prosecution against him." 32 U.S.L. WEEK at 4526.
4. This process has encompassed many of the basic liberties protected by the first
eight amendments. Thus in Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), the Court ex-
tended to state criminal proceedings the right to counsel guaranteed by the sixth amend-
ment. Its language was indicative of its more active attitude toward the due process re-
quirement:
We accept Belts v. Brady's assumption, based as it was on our prior cases, that
a provision of the Bill of Rights which is "fundamental and essential to a fair trial"
is made obligatory upon the States by the Fourteenth Amendment. We think the
Court in Belts was wrong, however, in concluding that the Sixth Amendment's
guarantee of counsel is not one of these fundamental rights.
Id. at 342.
Similarly, in Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962), the Court for the first time
explicitly held the eighth amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment
to be an essential protection which applied to state action through incorporation in the
due process clause. True, the Court did not so treat its holding - it said merely that
California, in jailing defendants convicted of dope addiction, inflicted "cruel and unusual
punishment in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments." Id. at 666. How-
ever, in the case which was relied upon for interpreting the scope of the due process clause,
Louisiana cx rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459 (1947), the Court had explicitly re-
fused to decide whether due process included the eighth amendment. It was thus for the
first time that the Court applied the protection to limit the state action in Robinson.
Finally, in a series of cases culminating in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), the
fourth amendment prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures has been held
to apply fully to the states through the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.
See also Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949), applying the basic fourth amendment pro-
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by policy considerations basic to a system which values human dignity and
self-respect. These basic values are embodied both in the fifth amendment
privilege and in the concept of fundamental fairness represented by the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment.5
The Court's resolution of the tricky problems raised in the ilMurphy case,
however, is less satisfactory. A series of decisions culminating in Feldman v.
United States C had established the "dual sovereignty" doctrine. The doctrine
held, simply, that the privilege against self-incrimination protects one only
against the sovereignty questioning him; the local sovereign need not take
cognizance of the danger of foreign prosecution.7
tection to state action, and Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960), extending the
federal exclusionary rule to bar from federal courts evidence illegally seized by state
officials.
5. While the government constantly needs to gain information from individuals as a
basis for maintaining order - see Comment, The Federal Witness Inununity Acts in
Theory and Practice: Treading the Constitutional Tightrope, 72 YALE L.J. 1563 (1963)
- its right to question is limited by the basic respect for human integrity inherent in
democratic society. It cannot, consistent with this respect, humiliate its individual citizens
by demanding that they disclose facts which may aid the state in establishing their own
guilt. An analogy clearly illustrates the importance of this protection. A society callously
disregarding human self-respect by forcing a man to press the button which electrocuted
him would surely shock most sensibilities. Yet, as one commentator has pointed out, hailing
an individual before a government organ and forcing his confession of crime or its ele-
ments, when another arm of the state will surely use the testimony to prosecute him, in
effect demands that the individual inflict his own punishment. Such a demand is clearly
inappropriate in a society based on respect for human dignity. See GRIswoLD, THE FIFTH
AMENDMENT TODAY 7-10 (1955). And the same values which vitalize the privilege are
the basis for the due process clause, "in. its protection of ultimate decency in a civilized
society." Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 61 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
The Court's resolution of the problem of standards to be applied by states is the only
dubious portion of its opinion. In rejecting respondents' contention that "the availability
of the federal privilege to a witness in a state inquiry is to be determined according to
a less stringent standard than is applicable in a federal proceeding," the Court answered
that "the same standards must determine whether an accused's silence in either a federal
or state proceeding is justified." 32 U.S.L. WEEK at 4509 (emphasis supplied). If the
Court meant that states could have no standards which in themselves offered less protec-
tion than that provided in federal courts, and that the only possible variations by states
might be the addition of extra protections after the panoply of federal standards had been
reproduced, its approach creates an unnecessarily rigid rule. For states might be able, by
allowing departures from the federal scheme but compensating for them by new proce-
dural safeguards, to offer the same quantum of protection afforded by the federal scheme.
Certainly the advantage of state experimentation with new techniques of law enforcement
is sufficiently great to warrant its protection. The Court's language in Malloy, therefore,
is best interpreted as a guarantee that the quantum of protection afforded by federal
standards must be met by states, rather than as a command of slavish adherence to fed-
eral procedures.
6. 322 U.S. 487 (1944). See also United States v. Murdock, 284 U.S. 141 (1931);
Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1906) ; Jack v. Kansas, 199 U.S. 372 (1905) ; Brown v.
Walker, 161 U.S. 591 (1896).
7. See the statement of the doctrine in Murdock:
[F]ull and complete immunity against prosecution by the government compelling
the witness to answer is equivalent to the protection furnished by the rvle agrinit
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The dual sovereignty doctrine, however, loses all theoretical justification
once it has been determined that the self-incrimination privilege is binding on
the states. For then it becomes a violation of the federal constitution for either
the federal government or any state to force an individual to give information
potentially leading to criminal conviction.8 Under the old doctrine,9 however,
a state and the national government (or any two states) might, by immunity
statutes, force an individual to accuse himself of crime. And to allow any two
jurisdictions together to effect what no single jurisdiction could accomplish
constitutionally would seem to defeat the purpose of the privilege. This might
present no problem in a federal hearing, since the supremacy clause would
probably make federal immunity binding on the states.10 But under traditional
doctrine neither the states themselves nor the federal government need respect
immunity granted by the laws of other states.
A practical justification for dual sovereignty can be argued, however, in
terms of the states' need for broad powers of investigation to discharge more
effectively their burden of regulating and preventing crime in the United
States." Since a state cannot insulate a witness from foreign prosecution by
a grant of immunity,'2 the complete abandonment of the dual sovereignty doc-
trine would prohibit states from constitutionally compelling witnesses to give
testimony which might incriminate under laws of other jurisdictions. This
could well represent a serious limitation on the state's ability to investigate.' 3
The Court in Murphy recognized this important state interest, and accom-
modated it in the rule laid down. By barring subsequent use in another juris-
diction of the original testimony or its fruits, the Court was able to preserve
the first sovereignty's right to compel testimony in exchange for immunity.14
An alternate approach in abolishing "dual sovereignty" would be to prohibit
the questioning in the first instance because of the danger of subsequent in-
compulsory self-incrimination.... As appellee at the hearing did not invoke pro-
tection against federal prosecution, his plea is without merit ....
284 U.S. at 149.
S. U.S. CONrST. amend. V, amend. XIV, § 1.
9. See note 7 supra.
10. See Reina v. United States, 364 U.S. 507 (1960) ; Ullmann v. United States, 350
U.S. 422 (1956) ; Adams v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 179 (1954) ; Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S.
591, 607-08 (1896).
11. There seems little dispute over the proposition that the major burden of criminal
law enforcement rests on the states. See Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 109 (1945) ;
Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187, 195 (1959) ; Rutkin v. United States, 343 U.S.
130, 141-42 (1942) (dissenting opinion) ; Rogge, Compelling the Testimony of Political
Deviants, 55 MIcH. L. REV. 163, 177 (1956). And the power of investigation is clearly
basic to discharging this burden. Cf. Comment, 72 YALE L.J. 1568 (1963).
12. See Knapp v. Schweitzer, 357 U.S. 371 (1958); Jack v. Kansas, 199 U.S. 372
(1905).
13. For a good, detailed statement of this view see Brief for Nat'l District Attorneys'
Assoc. as Amicus Curiae, Malloy v. Hogan, 32 U.S.L. WEEK 4507 (June 15, 1964).
14. 32 U.S.L. WEEK at 4526.
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crimination. This would represent the most airtight protection of the in-
dividual. 15 But the Court's approach is clearly preferable, at least in theory:
The detriment to individual dignity, as represented in the privilege, is negli-
gible, since none of his testimony or its fruits may be used to harm him.
Simultaneously, an important state interest - that of information-gather-
ing16 - is effectively protected. State courts and legislative committees are
enabled, by granting local immunity, to extract answers without being forced
to investigate the possibility of foreign prosecution 17 or having to wonder if
their immunity statutes can have extra-territorial effect.' 8 Further, another
important interest involved in the dual sovereignty situation - that of a sec-
ond sovereignty desiring subsequently to prosecute the witness - is also
theoretically protected by the Murphy decision. The rule, after all, does not
bar all subsequent prosecutions,' 9 but only those derived from the compelled
testimony. While this rule restricts the ability of foreign states and the federal
government to prosecute, it eliminates only that evidence produced by a wit-
ness's self-incriminatory testimony, in itself a mere windfall for any prosecut-
ing jurisdiction, which could not itself have forced such disclosures. 20
The Court's formulation in Murphy is thus theoretically perfect. It is sub-
ject, however, to one fatal objection: it is unworkable. The theoretical defer-
ence to the second jurisdiction's interest in prosecuting is illusory. The Court
made clear that subsequent prosecutions would still be permitted where the
prosecutor did not rely on the original testimony or leads obtained from it.
But the Court also explicitly stated that:
Once a defendant demonstrates that he has testified, under a state grant
o immunity, to matters related to the federal [or second state] prose-
15. Clearly the protection against being compelled to convict oneself is most com-
pletely effectuated if one is allowed to refrain from answering at all where incrimination
is a reasonable possibility. This view was a popular one prior to the Alurplky decision.
See Hutcheson v. United States, 369 U.S. 599, 624 (1962) (dissenting opinion) ; Knapp
v. Schweitzer, 357 U.S. 371, 383 (1958) (dissenting opinion); Kroner, Self-Incrimina-
tion: the External Reach of the Privilege, 60 CoLuat. L. REv. 816 (1960) ; Grant, Fed-
eralismn and Self-Incrimination, 4 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 549 (1957).
16. See note 11 supra.
17. This problem would be a significant one. State courts would be almost impossibly
burdened if possible foreign incrimination gave a complete right to silence. Since the
claimant of the privilege would be free of the obligation to justify his claim [Under Hoff-
man v. United States, 341 U.S. 479 (1951), as incorporated by Malloy], the court would
have to survey all state and federal laws in each case before it could be certain that a
given claim was frivolous. See 8 WiGmoRE, EViDENCE § 2258, at 338-39 (3d ed. 1940).
The impossibility of such a task could result in the success of almost any claim of privi-
lege, and thus in considerable abuse.
18. These statutes have no such effect. See note 12 supra.
19. The opinion of the Court in Murphy clearly recognizes the possibility of subse-
quent prosecution of witnesses for crimes related to their testimony. See 32 U.S.L. WEEK
at 4526 n.18.
1494 [Vol. 73 : 1491
SELF-INCRIMINATION
cution, the federal authorities have the burden of showing that its evidence
is not tainted by establishing that it had an independent, legitimate source
for the disputed evidence.
2 1
It would seem virtually impossible to discharge this burden of showing that
testimony known to an investigator did not influence him in conducting a
search for evidence upon which to base a prosecution. Any court faced with
such facts will probably find, in most cases, that the prosecutor has failed to
sustain that burden. Even in situations where a prosecutor was preparing or
had commenced an investigation, it would be difficult to show that testimony
about which he knew or should reasonably have known did not influence the
direction taken by his investigation. And where no investigation had been
undertaken before a witness testified, and investigation leading to prosecution
was then commenced, the burden could not be realistically discharged. The
resulting crippling limitation on the ability to prosecute could be more danger-
ous than a limitation on the ability to investigate. 22
If states conducting investigations and witnesses testifying before them were
sensitive to this problem, or if the witfiesses to whom immunity was granted
were uniformly of little importance from the viewpoint of foreign prosecutors,
the problem would be of relatively minor significance. But these eventualities
20. Under the philosophy of Malloy, if the privilege were guaranteed to all witnesses,
state or federal, clearly no prosecutor could force incriminatory disclosures and then use
them as the basis foi prosecution. See 32 U.S.L. WEEK 4507-08. It was this decision
which forced abandonment of dual sovereignty in Murphy. See 32 U.S.L. WEK at 4519.
The theoretical accommodation of all interests by this approach was doubtless the basis
for the numerous suggestions to adopt it which preceded Murphy. See Knapp v. Schweit-
zer, 357 U.S. 371, 382-85 (1958) (Black, J., dissenting) ; Danforth, Another Feldman -
Another Day, 29 GEo. WAsH. L. REv. 75 (1960); Comment, 55 Nw. U.L. REv. 110, 120
(1960) ; cf. Note, 68 YALE L.J. 322, 332-34 (1958).
21. 32 U.S.L. WEK at 4526 n.18. This rule would be analogous to that used to regu-
late statutory violations of the wiretap acts - once an improper act on the part of the
government is proved (here a compulsion to testify), the burden shifts to it to prove that
all or the remainder of its evidence has not been derived from the act. United States v.
Coplon, 185 F.2d 629, 636 (2d Cir. 1950) ; United States v. Goldstein, 120 F.2d 485, 488
(2d Cir. 1941), aff'd, 316 U.S. 114 (1942). Cf. United States v. Lipshitz, 132 F. Supp.
519, 522-23 (E.D.N.Y. 1955). A significant distinction exists between the two cases, how-
ever; the second sovereignty in a dual sovereignty case is guilty of no misconduct equiv-
alent to that of the sovereignty in wiretap cases. Rather than being saddled with a proof
burden due to its own act, the prosecuting sovereign in a dual sovereignty case must dis-
charge a burden which the acts of another, the investigating jurisdiction, have imposed
on it.
22. While a limit on investigation. can be onerous, necessary information may still be
obtained by other avenues. When the right to prosecute at all is foreclosed, however, as
the burden of proof demands, criminals are simply left at large. Yet this result is de-
manded by a rule which would accomplish the work of the privilege itself. Cf. Counsel-
man v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547, 586 (1892) ; Comment, The Scope of Statutory Immunity
Required by the Fifth Amendment Self-Incrimination Privilege, 57 Nw. U.L. REv. 561,
563-64 (1962).
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are uncertain and, indeed, unlikely. Witnesses surely will not willingly co-
operate with officials likely to prosecute them. And there is substantial evi-
dence, from earlier federal experience, that witnesses in fear of prosecution
are far less concerned with self-defamation than with avoiding imprisonment
for their misdeeds. 23 "Immunity baths,"A in which witnesses who are likely
targets for federal or state prosecution would attempt general confessions,
may be expected. There seems little reason to expect significantly more sym-
pathy from local state officials than from witnesses themselves. The motives
of state prosecutors or investigators will often be unrelated to any foreign
state or federal interest,25 and circumstances sometimes arise in which the local
state's interests will be opposed to those of other jurisdictions. It is unreason-
able to expect state officials to be sensitive to the demands of other jurisdic-
tions, especially when there is some strong motive impelling them to demand
information. And these situations may often concern individuals whom other
jurisdictions are anxious to prosecute. The dual sovereignty cases themselves
exhibit the desire of officials in other jurisdictions to conduct such prosecu-
tions. In the Feldman 28 case, for example, the defendant had been questioned
in a New York proceeding to ascertain his assets as a judgment debtor: his
answers revealed that he had used the mails in a scheme to defraud, for which
federal prosecution was instituted.2 7 And many other examples in which two
jurisdictions' legitimate interests would clash even more violently might also
be suggested. Thus an obstreperous Southern state legislature could "investi-
gate" election activities within the state to gain the testimony of officials who
had interfered with the right to vote in violation of the Civil Rights Acts.28
If such testimony were given, any subsequent federal prosecution would be
severely hampered. 29
23. Comment, 72 YALE LJ. 1568, 1572 (1963).
24. Ibid.
25. Thus state and federal statutes may govern similar conduct for differing reasons.
Payments to labor officials in New York, for example, may constitute a violation of N.Y.
PENAL LAW § 380, concerning extortion, whose enforcement is based on local police
considerations, while the same payments are regulated by § 302 of the Taft-Hartley Act,
61 Stat. 157 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 186 (1958), for vastly different reasons. See Knapp
v. Schweitzer, 357 U.S. 371 (1958).
26. 322 U.S. 487, 488-89 (1944).
27. Similarly, in Commonwealth v. Rhine, 303 S.W.2d 301 (Ky. 1957), the Kentucky
case in which extraterritorial effect was given to the state privilege, defendant had been
asked questions concerning his associations. The answers could have spurred a federal
prosecution under the Smith Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2385 (1958), which was being vigorously
enforced during the 1950's. See EmERSON & HABER, POLIIcAL AND CrviL RIGHTS IN THE
UNITED STATES 371-72 (2d ed. 1958).
28. 18 U.S.C. § 242 (1958).
29. Examples of state against state conflict are equally easy to conceive. Thus a state
in investigating an interstate crime ring may grant immunity to an individual whose local
activities are insignificant but whose interstate activities make him a prime target for an-
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In rejecting the Court's solution in Murphy as unworkable, great weight
is being given here to the state interest in criminal prosecution and adminis-
tration. The Court in Malloy, however, rightfully overrode such interests in
deciding the general question of the applicability of the fifth amendment to
the states.30 It is submitted that the interests involved in Malloy and Murphy
differ substantially, and that the resultant balance struck between state and
individual interests need not and should not be the same in the two cases.
In the first place, the Malloy rule, applying the self-incrimination privilege
against the states, does not substantially interfere with the demands of local
criminal administration. True, the state clearly has an interest in the gaining
of information in legislative or special grand jury hearings on subjects of pub-
lic interest and at trial as to the facts of crime.81 In the legislative setting,
however, gaining information for probable legislation, and not the entrapment
of criminals, is the purpose of investigation.32 Guaranteeing the privilege
against state action, therefore, need have no adverse effect on legislative effi-
ciency. If the desired information is of significance to the state, an appropriate
immunity statute can be invoked - or enacted if one does not exist 33 -
and the witness may be forced to answer any relevant questions.34 Of course,
to the extent that an investigation is a guise for an attempt to expose and
prosecute criminals by forcing them to admit crimes, immunity statutes would
not ease the burden imposed on interrogators as a result of the incorporation
of the privilege. But it would seem outrageous to withhold protection of the
privilege for the purpose of exposing criminals to trickery by state investiga-
tors.8'
On the other hand, the interest of states in forcing testimony by the accused
at trial might appear to be a significant obstacle to incorporation. Still, al-
other state's prosecution; he may answer questions revealing the nature of his foreign
activities to a significant extent, eliminating the possibility of a subsequent foreign prose-
cution.
30. It held that "the same privilege" which protects federal witnesses and defendants
is applicable to state proceedings. 32 U.S.L. WEEK at 4508. See note 5 supra.
31. See note 5 mipra.
32. Comment, 72 YALE L.J. 1568 (1963).
33. States appear to have no reluctance to enact immunity statutes. Each has enacted
numerous statutes to fit the needs of local administration. See 8 WIGMoRE, EvIFNscE
§ 2281 n.11 (3d ed. 1940).
34. The privilege is satisfied if a witness is protected against a reasonable possibility
of subsequent prosecution growing out of his testimony. Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142
U.S. 547 (1892) ; Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591 (1896). Very few cases are likely to
arise in which states could not grant constitutionally sufficient immunity, except in dual
sovereignty situations. See Jack v. Kansas, 199 U.S. 372 (1905); Knapp v. Schweitzer,
357 U.S. 371 (1958).
35. This especially seems true given the purpose underlying the due process clause
and the standards for applying it. See note 5 supra.
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though some commentators on the law of evidence have criticized use of the
privilege to cut off vital sources of information,36 the growing improvement
in techniques for investigating and solving crimes makes the use of forced self-
accusation far less imperative than it may have been when these critics wrote.37
And the interest of the state in orderly criminal administration and familiar
procedures is hardly jeopardized by incorporating the privilege, since all states
already guarantee the privilege to some extent.8
In the Murphy situation, however, a different set of interests is involved.
A new factor, the interest of the second, prosecuting sovereignty, must be
considered along with those of the information-gathering sovereignty and the
individual. Generally, the prosecuting interest is more strongly felt than the
information-gathering interest ;39 in many cases the interest of the second juris-
diction will be greater than that of the first.40 Further, as demonstrated above,
the Murphy rule, while adequately protecting both the individual's and the in-
terrogator's interests, obstructs to a great extent the prosecutor's ability to
discharge his societal function.41
Such a result is both undesirable and unnecessary. This important prosecu-
torial interest can be accommodated consistently with broader protection for
the individual - though admittedly short of the complete protection envisioned
in Murphy - than existed under the dual sovereignty rule. Thus while the
extended exclusionary rule derived from abolishing Feldman may prove harm-
ful, the actual holding of Feldman, that testimony compelled in a state hearing
could be used as evidence in a federal prosecution,42 was rightly overruled. For
introduction of such testimony seems the harshest possible undercutting of the
36. The accused is, after all, more likely than any other to know the degree and cir-
cumstances of his involvement in the crime with which he is charged. 8 WiGMoRE, EvI-
DENCE § 2251 (3d ed. 1940) ; McCormicx, EVIDENCE § 136 (1954).
37. Indeed, this shifting balance of power between state and individual has increased
the need for more positive aids to the individual such as criminal discovery. See, e.g.,
Louisell, Criminal Discovery - Dilemma Real or Apparent?, 49 CArx. L. REV. 56, 87
(1961). It is used as the basis for proposed rules on defendants' criminal discovery of
state's evidence. See Fletcher, Pretrial Discovery in State Criminal Cases, 12 STAN. L.
REV. 293, 305 (1960).
38. All but two states have self-incrimination, guarantees in their state institutions.
8 WxGmonz, EVIDEN c § 2252 n.3 (3d ed. 1940). And the others guarantee it by statute.
IowA CODE ANN. § 622.14 (1954); N.J. STAT. ANN. 2A 84A 17-18 (Supp. 1963). Iowa,
significantly, interpreted the privilege into its constitutior's due process clause long before
it was enacted by statute. State v. Height, 117 Iowa 650, 91 N.W. 935 (1902). The lack
of uniform standards, however, made the incorporation question hardly a moot one. In.
deed, the application of federal standards in Malloy was the basis for reversal. 32 U.S.L.
WEEx at 4509-10.
39. See note 22 supra.
40. See notes 28 and 29 supra and accompanying text.
41. See text accompanying notes 21 and 22 supra.
42. 322 U.S. 487, 493-94.
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purpose of the privilege. If, by affording the privilege, society has decided
that it is inconsistent with human dignity for a government to force an in-
dividual to convict himself, and that it is fundamentally unfair to subject him
to penalty for failing to do so, it hardly seems that society can, consistent with
that decision, introduce testimony compelled in one jurisdiction as evidence to
convict in another.43 It is, no doubt, somewhat inconsistent with this policy
even to use the fruits of such testimony in a subsequent foreign proceeding,
despite the fact that this extension of the privilege, as noted above,44 is in
practice unworkable. But disallowing introduction of the testimony itself -
obviously a less severe hindrance of state criminal administration 45 _ would
at least eliminate the most blatant incursion on the policy of the privilege.
Of course, the possibility would remain that the fruits of a witness's testi-
mony could be used against him in a subsequent foreign proceeding. While
this possibility cannot be entirely eliminated due to the practical demands of
law enforcement noted earlier,4 6 some protection can be afforded. Overruling
United States v. Murdock 47 is a step in that direction, to the extent that
MA'iurdock held foreign prosecution wholly irrelevant to a claim of the privilege;
taking account of foreign prosecutions is consistent, moreover, with the ap-
proach used by those states willing to give extraterritorial effect to their local
privilege.48 Following the lead indicated by most of the states extending the
43. See note 5 supra. If it is inconsistent with the amendment's spirit to force an
answer where defendant may reasonably fear danger, even though not immediate, from
replying [see Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486-87 (1951)], it is far more
inconsistent to allow an individual's compelled answer to be read into the record against
him in a subsequent hearing. Such a practice is pure, compelled self-accusation. This
argument obviously assumes compulsion of the first answer; if the privilege is waived,
as it can easily be [see, e.g., Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367, 377 (1951)] no
problems arise.
44. See text accompanying notes 21-29 supra.
45. Prior testimony used as evidence would unquestionably be a pure windfall for a
subsequent prosecutor. He could in no way have compelled the evidence without granting
immunity. All the rule requires of him is that he discover sufficient evidence to prosecute
without the direct help of the prospective defendant, which he would have had to do if
the defendant had never testified in the first place. It should also be noted that this rule
furthers a policy which some commentators have proposed in justification for the privi-
lege - the maintenance by prosecutors of high standards of operation and effectiveness
through the closing off of easy, slipshod roads to gaining convictions. See 8 McCoRMncK,
EVIDENCE § 136, at 289 (1954).
46. See text accompanying notes 21-29 supra.
47. 284 U.S. 141 (1931).
48. Several states had extended application of their local privilege prior to the
M trphy ruling. Thus, the Supreme Court of Michigan held in People v. Den Uyl, 318
Mich. 645, 29 N.W.2d 284 (1947), that a witness who was under federal indictment was
not obliged to testify in a state proceeding, even when granted state immunity, since his
testimony would obviously aid in the federal prosecution:
Holdings [that the privilege covers foreign incrimination] . . . are essential to
render fairly effective the quoted State constitutional provision against self-in-
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reach of the privilege, the reference by a witness to a pending or imminent 40
crimination. It seems like a travesty on verity to say that one is not subjected to
self-incrimination when compelled to give testimony in a State judicial proceeding
which testimony may forthwith be used against him in a Federal criminal prose-
cution.
318 Mich. at 651, 29 N.W.2d at 287.
Louisiana similarly held, in State ex rel. Doran v. Doran, 215 La. 151, 39 So. 2d 894
(1949), that a witness being cross-examined on a matter not strictly related to his pur-
pose in testifying could claim the privilege as to the unrelated issue, because of an indict-
ment pending in California. The doctrine announced was considerably circumscribed in
subsequent cases, however. See State v. Ford, 233 La. 992, 99 So. 2d 320 (1958).
Similar decisions had been rendered in Kentucky, Pennsylvania, and Florida. In
Commonwealth v. Rhine, 303 S.W.2d 301 (Ky. 1957), the Kentucky Court of Appeals
held that its constitutional provision protecting against self-incrimination applied to a
possible federal prosecution and the court applied federal standards to determine how it
should treat a claim of the privilege and what answers might be incriminatory. In Penn-
sylvania, a pending federal indictment was held by a county court sufficient ground for a
claim of state privilege. Altieri v. Pennsylvania Coal Co., 25 Pa. D. & C.2d 714 (County
Ct. 1961) ; see also Putnik Travel & Tourist Agency v. Goldberg, 17 Pa. D. & C.2d 590
(County Ct. 1958). And Florida declared not only that its self-incrimination privilege
protects against incrimination under foreign law where prosecution is likely, but that its
constitution protected against the state's use of self-incriminatory information given in-
voluntarily in a federal proceeding. State v. Kelly, 71 So. 2d 887 (Fla. 1954). See also
Lorenzo v. Blackburn, 74 So. 2d 289 (Fla. 1954).
In three states similar statutory protection had been extended to witnesses. In Illinois,
the statute provides that a claim of privilege is good and immunity statutes are inappli-
cable where foreign prosecution is possible, and federal standards are used for interpret-
ing the right. ILL. Rxv. STAT. 38:580(a) (1953) ; see People v. Burkert, 7 Ill. 2d 506,
131 N.E.2d 495 (1955). And similar, if less sweeping, statutes had been enacted in Cali-
fornia and New Jersey. CAL. PENA.L CODE § 1324 (Supp. 1963) (applies in felony pro-
ceedings only - not yet construed) ; N.J. REv. STAT. 2A:84A-18 (Supp. 1963) [clear
justification for claim necessary, In re Boiardo, 34 N.J. 599, 170 A.2d 816 (1961) ; see
also In re Waterfront Commission, 39 N.J. 436, 189 A.2d 36 (1963)]. The cases in
Michigan, Florida, Louisiana and Pennsylvania, broadening application of the local privi-
lege, have, however, extended allowance of invocation only when foreign prosecution was
pending or imminent. In the leading Michigan case, for example, federal indictment was
pending, and other Michigan opinions have been couched in cautious language noting and
condemning the possibilities of abusing the privilege. See In re Watson, 293 Mich. 263,
284, 291 N.W. 652, 661 (1940). And in the remaining three states, claims of privilege
have been rejected on the ground that federal prosecution was not pending or imminent.
E.g., State v. Kelley, 71 So. 2d 887 (Fla. 1954) ; State v. Ford, 233 La. 992, 99 So. 2d
320 (1956).
49. If no pending prosecution could be pointed to, the witness would have the burden
of showing by clear and convincing evidence that a proceeding was to be instituted. He
might thus be required to point to public declarations of intent to prosecute him by some
foreign official or a foreign sovereign's announced campaign against offences related to
the present local investigation, which clearly was likely to direct itself at the witness very
soon. This extra requirement on witnesses in dual sovereignty cases - which does not
exist in single sovereignty cases - see Malloy, 32 U.S.L. WEEK at 4510 - is not only
practically necessary, but to some extent theoretically justifiable. The most important
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federal or state proceeding against him would be grounds for a legitimate as-
sertion of privilege. The court in each case would, of course, still be free under
the rationale of Hoffinan v. United States r to determine, as in general claims
of the federal privilege, whether under all the circumstances the witness could
have a reasonable fear that his testimony would be used in a foreign action.5 1 If
so, he would be entirely insulated from forced self-accusation; if not, the court
could then compel his answer. And such a decision would not constitute a
violent break with precedent, since cases prior to Murdock rested on the
ground that foreign prosecution was highly unlikely and therefore irrelevant. r2
In one important area, however, the Murphy rule is appropriate. Where
the two sovereignties involved are actively cooperating in attempting to prose-
cute or extract information from an individual, the fruits of his testimony
should be excluded along with the testimony itself.5 3 In such cases, after all,
the interests of the sovereignties are the same, and the reason for treating the
case differently from Malloy therefore vanishes.5 4
The Court in Murphy was correct in abolishing the anomalous doctrine of
dual sovereignty. But it went too far in holding fruits of compelled testimony
as well as the testimony itself protected in all cases from subsequent prosecu-
torial use. 5 Two steps, however, can be taken, consistent with the demands
of orderly criminal administration, to gain greater protection for witnesses in
situations where multiple prosecutions pend: a claim of privilege can be al-
lowed where a second related federal or state prosecution is pending or clearly
imminent, and an exclusionary rule can be applied to bar from subsequent
prosecution testinony rendered under compulsion. These two steps, combined
circumstance to which a court must look when privilege is claimed is the likelihood of
future prosecution based on testimony which the recalcitrant witness might give. It is
clear that future prosecution by a foreign state based on testimony offered in a hearing
is as a general rule far less likely than local prosecution growing from the same answer.
Requiring a preliminary showing of reasonable foreign danger by the witness is thus not
entirely consistent with the approach of single sovereignty cases.
50. 341 U.S. 479 (1951).
51. Id. at 486-87.
52. See Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 32 U.S.L. WEEK at 4524.
53. The Court implied that it was willing to allow this exception, to Feldman long
before it was willing to adopt the sweeping approach of Murphy. Knapp v. Schweitzer,
357 U.S. 371, 380-81 (1958) ; Feldman v. United States, 322 U.S. 487, 494 (1944); see
Byars v. United States, 273 U.S. 28 (1927).
54. The great danger implicit in the broad rule of Murphy (see text accompanying
notes 21-29 supra) does not appear in this limited situation. The clash of federal and state
(or two state) interests feared in other cases is unlikely, and, in any case, irrelevant
where collaboration exists between the two jurisdictions involved or where one deliberately
instigates investigation by the other.
55. Any attempt to limit the Court's holding appears foredoomed. The opinion's lan-
guage is broad and clear in requiring full self-incrimination protection in the dual sov-
ereignty context. See note 3 supra.
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with the Malloy holding that the privilege is essential to due process and
therefore demanded of the states, would go as far as possible toward fulfilling
the policy of the self-incrimination privilege in upholding individual integrity
without unduly burdening state criminal procedures.
